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Numerous incidents are coming to light wherein the 
deaf are being deprived of the basic rights guaranteed to 
all citizens in this country. ~any Americans are being . 
denied the rights to communicate, to travel freely, to · 
obtain an adequate education, to acquire respectable em-
ployment or to maintain custody of their children. In 
addition, they are often deprived of their basic right to 
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . 1 
Our legal system seems to be unaware of the plight 
of the deaf in communicating with the hearing world, as 
evidenced by the prevalence of cases involving injustices 
to the hearing-handicapped. 2 
Brutality of deaf people is more widespread than is 
commonly known. The September 18, 1967, Newsweek reported 
that a deaf mute was shot by National Guardsmen during the 
Detroit riots after warnings were reportedly shouted at 
him. On February 14, 1969, the Chicago Sun-Times described 
an incident in which two policemen arrested and then 
allegedly beat four youths who came to the rescue of a 17-
year-old deaf-mute being clubbed by one of the policemen 
because he was unable to hear the policeman's instructions. 
1 
2 
On June 13, 1969, the Chicago Daily News told of a young man 
who, as a result of his speech impairment, was shot and 
killed by two policemen. 
Little has been written for the deaf that may serve 
as a guide for them in handling the complexities of every-
day living. Myers presented an accounting of-- laws which 
affect the deaf and reviewed areas which create the most 
consternation for them.3 
Myers reported that suit was filed on behalf of 184 
deaf members of the Illinois Association for the Deaf 
against the Chicago Superintendent of Police due to in-
. 
creasing police brutality involving the hearing-impaired 
population of that city. 4 Although it was realized that the 
- - ---- -pOL1Ce wouLa naLuraLLY exper~ence some G1II~cuL~~e~ ~n 
interrogating such individuals, their apparent lack of 
understanding of this physical handicap and its imposed com-
municative limitations often led to the deaf person's 
inability to understand being interpreted as apparent un-
willingness to cooperate. Although some significant 
attempts were made by Superintendent of Police James B. 
Conlisk, very few alterations in policy seemed to filter 
down to the level of actual practice. As a result of such 
injustices Myers presents a simplified version of instruc-
tions for the deaf to follow if confronted by the police. 5 
The data for this publication was compiled from new9paper 
reports, personal contacts and court proceedings. 
Brett reported a case in which a deaf man was 
,., 
convicted of murder on what appeared to be insufficient 
evidence compounded by his inability to effectively com-
municate at the trial due to his handicap. 6 
3 
Myers cautions the deaf about possible underhanded 
business · methods including high-pressure tactics, threats, 
fraud and forge~y which are not uncommonly -reported in 
dealings with the hearing-impaired. 7 
Consumer Reports cited the case where an individual 
was convicted of mail fraud in a federal court for selling 
hearing aids to deaf people at prices as high as 10 times 
those suggested by the manufacturers. 8 
Under ancient common law, a person born deaf was 
considered incapable of making a valid contract, the theory 
being that such a person would be unable to comprehend the 
true nature of the contract and could be eas~ly duped. To 
protect these people, the courts refused to enforce con-
tracts made by them. Although this viewpoint offered some 
protection from harmful contracts, it also served to limit 
their freedom in economic transactions. They could not 
enter into business, purchase land, obtain credit or even 
make a will. 9 
A person not born deaf but who later became so 
afflicted, was often the subject of litigation, this l~ti­
gation being an attempt by others to have such a person 
adjudged incompetent. 
Due to the severe language deficiency of the deaf 
individual, the everyday vocabulary of the hearing world 
4 
requires translation as well as interpretation in order to > 
be fully comprehended by the deaf. 10 This need has led to 
, 
laws being instituted in some states insuring the use of an 
interpreter in criminal proceedings involving a deaf defend-
ant. The national Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, 
recognizing its responsibilities to the deaf ; - has estab-
lished procedures for educating its members through the use 
of simulated trials involving both deaf litigants and at-
torneys. Recently the Florida Registry of Interpreters for 
the Deaf has taken the lead in implementing this program in 
that state. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
-., 
The amount of data currently available for use by 
attorneys in preparation of. cases for hearing-impaired 
clients is seriously limited. A compilation of precedent-
setting cases involving deaf citizens would be invaluable 
to the conscientious legal counselor. Such an up-to-date 
compendium of legal information is presently nonexistent. 
There is an apparent need for the deaf population 
of our country to be made aware of the problems they face 
in everyday living. No recent publications are available 
which inform the deaf _of these problems or of how others 
have overcome similar predicaments. 
In addition, no significant publications exist which 
expose the apparent inequities perpetrated upon the deaf 
population of this country. The general public is ignorant 
of these injustices in an era of unequaled civil rights 
awareness. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The lack of information concerning these injustices 
is identified as the problem; the purpose of this study is 
to compile information intended to alleviate the problem. 
Such data will be of considerable value to the attorney 
preparing cases for the deaf, for the deaf individual him-
self so that he might be fully acquainted with his rights 
and limitations and, finally, for the American public so 
that they might be informed of the present status of our 
aurally handicapped. 
METHODOLOGY 
All legal cases in the United States which have af-
fected deaf or hearing-impaired persons were reviewed to 
determine their judicial history and interpretation. This 
was accomplished through the extensive utilization of 
Shepard's Citations, Corpus Juris Secundum and American 
Jurisprudence.ll Through the use of these legal digests 
this researcher was able to obtain the primary source of 
every case reported that involves deaf individuals. 
All such cases conducted in . the u.s. Supreme Court 
. 
and all federal and state courts were a part of that 
review. Also included were cases found in the National 
Reporter System, articles in legal periodicals and 
5 
annotations in the Annotated Reports System. 
All such cases reviewed that seemed to be of sig-
nificance to the purpose of this research now comprise an 
up-to-date compendium of virtually every court case in the 
United States -·affecting deaf or hearing-impaired people. 
These have been assembled under such divisions as "Wills," 
"Competency as Witnesses," "Capacity to Marry" and "Child 








DEAF PERSONS IN THE COURTROOM 
Competency as Witnesses 
The presumption of law in ancient times was that 
deaf mutes, so born, were idiots which, of course, would 
render them incompetent to testify [Lord Hale in his Pleas 
of the Crown, 1 (Hale) P.~. 34, 9 A.L.R. 482 (1795)]. 
Later, deaf persons were considered to be of limited in-
telligence and, therefore, were still not permitted to 
testify as witnesses. 12 ' . -
This former legal presumption of idiocy has largely, 
if not errtirely, disappeared or at least has been so far 
modified as to merely require that the party calling a deaf 
mute as a witness show certain qualifications, such as an 
understanding of the nature of an oath and sufficient intel-
ligence to permit receiving and communicating ideas regard-
ing fact and controversy [State vs. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 24 
S.W. 41 (1893)]. 
The presumption that a person deaf and mute from 
birth should be deemed an idiot does not seem to prevail 
in modern practice. Now, deaf mutes are considered com-
petent witnesses when they have sufficient knowledge to 
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, to com-
prehend the facts regarding their testimony and are capable 
7 
8 
of communicating their ideas with respect thereto [Dobbins 
vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. Co., 79 Ark. 85J 95 S.W. 794J 
9 A.L.R. 484 (1906); Ritchey vs. People, 23 Colo. 314, 47 
Pac. 272 (1896); State vs. DeWolfJ 8 C9nn. 93 (1830), 20 
Am. Dec. 90; People vs. Weston, 236 Ill . 104, 86 N.E. 188 
(1908); Snyder vs. Nations, 5 Black£. 295 (1840); Skaggs 
vs. State, 108 Ind. 53, 8 N.E. 695 (1886); State vs. But-
ler, 157 Iowa 163, 138 N.W. 383 (1912); State vs. Burns, 
. 78 N.W. 681 (1899)]. . .· ... ~ _. 
In order for a deaf person to be a competent wit-
ness, there are fundamental requirements to be fulfilled: 
·· 1. The witness must be able to understand the 
questions that are put to him, and he must be able to 
answer in some effective manner . . ! That is, he must have 
some practical system of communication. 
2. The witness must understand the obligation of 
his oath to tell only the truth. -· 
In the 1884 case of Territory vs. Duran, 3 N.M. 
189, 3 Pac. 53, a deaf mute eight or nine years of age was 
offered as a witness. The court held he was not a com-
petent witness in that he had never been educated and 
could not be made to understand the nature of an oath, and, 
in fact, could not make himself understood except as to 
most ordinary everyday wants, and then only through limited 
gestures understood by his family. In the court's dissent-
ing opinion, it was stated that the boy, who was the only 
eyewitness to a murder, had clearly and unmistakably through 
i ~ .. 
9 
the use of signs and pictures identified the murderers and 
showed how they had · committed the crime. 
1
• Initially, the 
court allowed the testimony, although it was demonstrated 
that the youth could not and did not comprehend the nature 
- -
of an oath.· Due to this situation, an appeal resulted in 
the dropping of all charges .against the defendants [Quinn 
vs. Halbert, 55 Vt. 229, reprint 16 Vt. 74 (1900)]. 
- :'- -
Another similar example is cited in the case of 
Pruitt vs. State, 232 Ala. 421, 168 So. 149 (1936), in 
which a 14-year-old deaf girl was an eyewitness to a murder 
committed by her father. Upon examination through an inter-
preter it was found that she knew who God was, she knew what 
it was to pray and that she knew what it was to tell the 
truth. She did not know what sin was, did not know where 
hell was nor did she know what becomes of bad little girls. 
The defendant objected, stating that under these circum-
stances she did not know the meaning and obligation of an 
oath and, therefore, should not be permitted to testify. 
The Alabama Supreme Court held that there was no error in 
permitting her to testify and that she was a competent 
witness. 
When a deaf witness has an adequate method of 
communication and understands the obligation of an oath, it 
is now firmly established that the witness is competent to 
testify. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa said in the case of State 
vs. Butler, 157 Iowa 163, 138 N.W. 283 (1912): 
'! 
,A " 
The suggestion that the deafness of 
Mrs. Atherton rendered her incompetent to 
testify is without merit. Even a deaf mute, 
if of sufficient mental capacity and able to 
communicate his ideas by signs or in writing, 
is a competent witness. (Cases cited.) 
Th~ _fa.ct that difficulty accompanies the examina-
tion of a deaf mute is no reason for excluding _his testi-
10 
mony [Ritchey vs. People, 23 Colo. 314, 47 Pac. 272 (1896); 
Burgess vs. State, 256 Ala. 5, 53 So. 2d 568 (1951)]. In 
the latter case, the defendant, Burgess, had been dating a 
deaf girl. The girl's father objected, and Burgess 
murdered the father in the presence · of the girl.. The girl 
testified at the trial as an eyewitness against Burgess, 
using a system of signs that were understood only by her 
",__~ ..... ,... ......... ~ ,., ...... ~T.; ~ I"'Y> ~ " -- - ___ ._._ . _  ..J _____ , - -.~ ---o ---
to cross-examine the witness properly under these circum-
stances, but the Alabama Supreme Court held against him, 
citing the opinions of two experts plus several cases. 
The general rule regarding evidence of the good 
reputation of a witness for truth and veracity is that it 
is inadmissible for the purposes of supporting his testi-
mony. The rule has been held inapplicable in at least one 
instance, where the witness was a deaf mute [Kirby vs. 
State (Okla.), 220 Pac. 74 (1923), 33 A.L.R. 1212, 58 Am. 
Jur. 742, Evidence, Sec. 812]. In this case, evidence 
attesting to the good reputation of a deaf and mute wit-
ness was found to be acceptable. 
11 
Methods of Testifying 
It has been held that the testimony of a deaf person 
may be obtained by any means that are necessary to that end 
[State vs. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 24 S.W. 41 (1893)]. 
There are generally two methods that can be used to 
· take the test.imony of a deaf person in court ;--(1) by 
submitting the questions to the witness in writing and 
having the witness answer them in writing, and (2) by 
using the sign language of the deaf and having an inter-
preter to translate the signs. (Language of signs in this 
context means natural and arbitrary gestures plus the 
manual alphabet or fingerspelling.) 
If no interpreter is available, it may be necessary 
to have the questions and answers put in writing. However, 
this is a very time-consuming process, and the courts are 
usually reluctant to spend the required hours to conduct 
this type of examination. This method of examination also 
gives the witness an unusually large amount of time to 
consider his answers to the questions. For this reason, it 
is particularly unsuitable -for cross-examination. 
Moreover, a deaf person's ability to express himself in 
writing may be very limited. 
For all of these reasons, it is generally 
considered preferable to conduct the examination in the 
language of signs through the use of an interpreter. This 
method of examination is much faster and, if a properly 




In English law, it has been said that it would seem 
to be better, in the case of a deaf and mute witness who 
can read and write, to conduct his examination in writing 
[Morrison vs;. -·Lennard, 3 Car. and P. (Eng.) 127, (1827)]. 
It is within the discretion of the trial court 
whether the testimony of deaf mutes shall be taken through 
an interpreter, by means of signs or by means of written 
question and answer [Dobbins vs. ·Little Rock R. & Elec. 
Co., 79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906), 9 A.L.R. 484, 53 Am. 
Jur. 44, Trial, Sec. 29; Skaggs vs. State, 108 Ind. 53, 
8 N.E. 695 (1886)]. 
For example, in the case of State vs. Dewolf, 8 
- -- ·---- .. - - - - -
\.;Ullll. ":J,J ".LO.JU), LU .till!. .uec. ~u, ~L. wao ::;nuwn L!lat- t..ue 
witness was able to express himself well in signs, but very 
poorly in writing. It was held, therefore, that it was 
correct and proper to take his testimony in the language 
of signs. 
The courts have also held that in the absence of a 
showing as to what constituted the best method of taking a 
deaf mute's testimony, it will be presumed on appeal that 
the trial court adopted the best method [Cleveland P. & E. 
Railway Co. vs. Pritschau, 69 Ohio 43, 8 N.E. 663 (1886), 
9 A.L.R. 480]. 
The court in the case of Bugg vs. Houlka, 122 Miss. 
400, 84 So. 387 (1920), arrived at a general rule, that deaf 
mutes who are competent to testify may give evidence by 
13 
signs, through an interpreter or in writing, The court 
further determined that once testimony is given, such tes-
timony is not considered hearsay. 
More specifically, it has been held that a deaf 
mute who cari .iead and write may testify through that 
medium, per the case of Ritchey vs. · People,. 23 - Colo. 314, 
47 Pac. 272 (1896), in which a deaf mute was examined by 
submitting to him written questions to which he replied 
in writing. The questions and answers were then read to 
the jury. 
The New York case of People vs. McGee, 1 Denio 
(N.Y.) 19 (1874), however, stated it is not necessary that 
a deaf witness be able to read and write. 
The general rul·e is that evie\!Jence ot a deat mute 
who can be communicated with by signs may be taken through 
an interpreter who understands such signs and can inter-
pret them to the court [Snyder vs. Nations, 5 B1ackf. 
(Ind.) _ 295 (1840); Skaggs vs. State, 108 Ind. 53, 8 N.E. 
695 (1886); State vs. Burns (Iowa), .78 N.W. 681 (1899); 
State vs. Smith, 203 l1o. 695, 102 S. W. 526 (1907); Bugg 
vs. Houlka, 122 Miss. 400, 84 So. 387 (1920), 9 A.L.R. 
480; People vs. McGee, 1 Denio (N.Y.)_ 19 (1874); State vs. 
Weldon, 39 S.C. 318, 24 L.R.A. 126, 17 S.E. 688 (1893)]. 
It has been held that it is permissible to take the 
testimony of a deaf mute through an interpreter by signs, 
although the witness may be proven capable of testifying 
via written responses [Dobbins vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. 
Co., 79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906), 9 A.L.R. 484; State 
vs. DeWolf, 8 Conn. · 93 (1830)]. This is at least where 
14 
there is no showing that the interpretation by signs is not 
the better method [Dobbins vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. Co., 
79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906), 9 A.L.R . 484]. 
Bugg vs. Houlka, 122 Miss. 400, 84 s;: 387 (1920), 
9 A.L.R. 480, states the evidence of a deaf mute given 
through an interpreter is admissible if the interpreter 
understands the signs usually employed by the witness and 
can properly interpret the meaning. This was later modi-
fied somewhat in Hudson vs. Augustine's, Inc., 72 Ill. App. 
2d 225, 218 N.E. 2d 510 (1966), 3la C.J.S. 224, which held 
" 
that a statement made by a deaf mute in sign language to a 
person not an expert in sign language was inadmissible. 
Rights in Criminal Cases 
The use of interpreters in criminal cases has 
special importance in view of the constitutional principle 
that a· person accused of a criminal offense has the right 
to be confronted by the persons who are to testify against 
him. The right of confrontati~n has always been construed 
to mean that the accused person has a right to hear the 
testimony of the witnesses against him. For example, when 
a defendant with normal hearing was required to sit so far 
from the witness box that he could not hear the testimony, 
it was held to be a violation of his constitutional rights 
[State vs. Weldon, 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43 (1893); State vs. 
Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 Pac. 542 (1899)]. 
15 
In some jurisdictions the accused may be entitled 
to have the testimony interpreted to him or to have his own 
·testimony interpreted, but, in general ·, the use of and the 
right to an interpreter is a matter of a trial court's dis-
cretion [23 - C~ J.S. 864, Criminal Law, Sec. 965]. 
The right of the accused to make a statement in his 
behalf is a personal privilege. However, there are in-
. ~.stances in which the only means of making the statement 
would be through .the voice of another, where the accused is 
aurally impaired [Smithwick vs. State, 199 Ga. 292, 34 S.E. 
2d 28 (1945), 23 C.J.S. 1109, Criminal Law, Sec. 1026]. 
It has been held that a defendant who is deaf is 
entitled to have the testimony against ·him translated for 
r: ' 
his benefit as in the case of Terry vs. State, 21 Ala. App. 
100, 105 So. 386 (1925). A deaf mute was found guilty of 
manslaughter in a trial where the request to appoint an 
interpreter was denied because the defendant was not able 
to furnish one. On appeal, the court held that the de-
fendant's right under the state constitution providing that 
in criminal prosecutions the accused had a right to be heard 
by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation and to be confronted by the witnesses and 
that he was not to be deprived of life, liberty or property 
except by due process of law, was violated in not providing 
the necessary means for communicating to the defendant the 
nature and cause of the accusation and also the testimony 
of the witnesses against him. The court continued, the 
16 
physical infirmity of the defendant could not lessen his 
constitutional right, and the state had to accord the means 
by which he should receive all the. rights, benefits and 
privileges which the constitution provided. 
Sim1larly, in the case of Ralph vs. State, 124 Ga. 
81, 52 S.E. 298 (1905), the Supreme Court of Georgia said: 
The constitutional right of one 
accused of an offense against the laws of 
this State to be confronted with the wit-
.nesses contemplates that they shall be 
examined in his presence and be subject 
to cross-examination by him. Where a 
defendant is deaf and cannot hear the 
evidence of the witnesses for the State, 
the presiding judge should permit some 
reasonable mode of having their evidence 
communicated to him. 
The same rule was set forth in the case of Mothers-
head vs. King, 112 F. 2d 1104 (1940), wherein a deaf man 
brought ·a petition in the federal courts complaining that 
10 years previously, at the time of his criminal trial, he 
had pleaded guilty to the charge against him without know-
ing the nature of the charge, due to the lack of an inter-
preter and the lack of an attorney to defend him. The man 
claimed he had never waived his right to an attorney and 
that, due to the lack of an interpreter, he was not able to 
understand what was being done to him. 
The federal court held that if this was true he was 
entitled to relief by the courts, even though a long period 
had elapsed since the time of his trial. 
A deaf person has a constitutional right to have an 
interpreter at his criminal trial, but this constitutional 
17 
right can be waived by the deaf person. It has been held 
that where a deaf person did not request such an inter-
preter at the time of bis trial, he was deemed to have 
waived it and he could not later complain about the absence 
of such an ·interpreter. In the case of Felts vs. Murphy, 
201 U.S. 123, 50 L. Ed. 689 (1906), · the court- said that 
although it was regrettable that the testimony was not 
read nor repeated to the ·defendant, such omission did not 
result in the defendant's having been deprived of liberty 
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth 
- . . 
Amendment. [See also Field vs .. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 137, 
232 s.w. 2d 717 (1950).] 
. Although the deaf defendant must be afforded the 
opportunity to have testimony ot Yitnesses communicated to 
him, the exact manner of communication depends upon the 
circumstances of the case and the discretion of the trial 
judge [Ralph vs. State, 124 Ga. 81, 52 S.E. 298 (1905)]. 
Further, the appeals court stated that the defendant, know-
ing of his infirmity, had to make provision for his own 
assistance and could not require the court to destroy an 
orderly proceeding. It was noted that the trial judge in 
this case had allowed time and opportunity for the accused's 
counsel to take down and exhibit the testimony to the 
accused, and no harm had been shown to have resulted from 
the method adopted. 
In the case of People vs. Guillory, 178 Cal. App. 
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deafened defendant, in appealing conviction for bribery, 
alleged he was denied due process because he could not hear 
the proceedings of the trial ·. The court held that here the 
defendant was allowed to sit in the jury box in order to be 
able to hear -atl connnents. The court also said that when 
the defendant appeared in court without live -catteries· in 
his hearing device, any handicap he might have suffered 
from his hearing loss was self-imposed and gave no ground 
for complaint. 
In State vs. Gayton, 221 La. 1115, 61 So. 2d 890 
(1952), the defendant claimed that his deafness rendered 
him incapable of understanding the nature of the proceed-
ings against him and of assisting his counsel. The court 
held that there was no merit for his contention since at 
the arraignment the judge wrote the charge on a piece of 
paper, showed it to the defendant who could read, and the 
defendant pointed to the words "not guilty" in response to 
a request to plead. The court based its findings on the 
assumption that the defendant's hearing was sufficiently 
corrected with the use of a hearing aid and since it 
appeared that he and his counsel conversed in whispers 
without difficulty during the trial. 
A deaf mute petitioner to the Court of Appeals of 
the State of Oklahoma was deemed not entitled to relief on 
the contention that failure of the sentencing court to 
afford him an interpreter resulted in denial of his Sixth 
Amendment· right to ·effective assistance of counsel. 
19 
Conununication between the petitioner and his counsel was 
allowed by submitting written questions to the accused who 
answered such questions in his own handwriting [Stevens vs . 
... . 
Page, 420 F. 2d 933 (1969)]. 
-
Thus far, only three states, Tennessee, Oklahoma 
and Illinois, have enacted statutes which provide an in-
terpreter to be furnished at the cost of the court in any 
criminal action involving a deaf mute defendant.13 
Who Can Act as an Interpreter 
It frequently happens that a deaf person involved. 
in litigation will want to have a friend or relative act 
as interpreter. . When such a person is about to act as in-
terpreter in a case, the opposing party has been found to 
usually object, stating that the person is not a proper 
individual to act as interpreter because he is a friend of 
the deaf person and, therefore, may not be impartial. This 
issue was raised in the case of State vs. Burns (Iowa), 78 
N.W. 681 (1899), and the Iowa Supreme Court said, " ... 
There is not a thing to show unfairness or prejudice from 
the use of (this) interpreter. · Mere friendship will not 
raise a presumption of prejudice." 
Similarly, in the ca_se of Morse vs. Phillips 
(Miss.), 128 So. 336 (1930), which involved a deaf man who 
had been shot by a constable without apparent reason, the 
deaf man had his daughter act as his interpreter. It was 
objected to by the other party, claiming it was improper 
for a daughter to act as interpreter for her father, 
20 
particularly in view of the fact that the daughter herself 
was also a witness in -the case. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court said, in its lengthy ruling on the question: 
The simple fact that an interpreter 
is a ~~lative of a party to the proceeding, 
or ·of the one whose evidence he interprets, 
will not render such interpreter incompetent 
.... That an interpreter, otherwise unobjec-
tionable, has testified or will testify in 
the same case, does not render him incom-
petent .... To reject her as an interpreter 
was to reject the most nearly perfect way 
or means of interpreting the testimony of 
the witness .... 
This general rule was later evident in the case of 
Burgess vs. State, 256 Ala. 5, 53 So. 2d 568 (1951), 
wherein the brother of a deaf mute witness was allowed to 
be the interpreter and such was held not to be in error 
upon appeal. 
The matter is discussed in Corpus Juris Secundum 
as follows: 
Furthermore, an interpreter has been 
·held not to be disqualified or rendered incom-
petent merely because he is interested in the 
outcome of the particular suit of prosecution*, 
or because he is related to a party or witness 
in the proceeding*, or has had friendly rela-
tions with the parties*, or because he has been 
subpoenaed as a witness*, has listened to the 
testimony of other witnesses in the case*, or 
has, himself, testified or will testify*, or 
because, in a cri~~nal case, he is a member of 
the police force. 
Where the court has approved the use of an inter-
preter who is an interested party, and the opposing side 
fears the interpreter may falsely interpret the testimony, 
the proper procedure is for the opposite party to secure 
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their own i11terpreter who will be able to tell them if any 
mistakes are made in he translations. 
Additional Criminal Mnt ters 
Criminal Responsibility 
Generally speaking, physical handicaps such as 
deafness or blindness do not, . per ~~ . affect -the l~gal 
capacity to commit a ime [40 Am. Jur. 2d 315, Criminal 
Responsibility, Sec. 23] . . It has been held that the fact 
the defendant was a d gf mute is simply a circumstance to 
be considered by the jury in connection with other evidence 
in determining whethe . he was mentally capable of committing 
the crime [Belcher vs . Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 649, 117 S.W. 
455 (1915), 21 Am. Ju~ . Zd 111, Criminal Law, Sec. 26]. 
- . ...... 
v..<::q.J.a.\.... .J... '- y ~.- v u :.tnu 1. r ~a J. 
In determinin a defendant's capacity to stand trial, 
the test is whether h _ has the capacity to comprehend his 
position, to understat d the nature and object of the pro-
ceedings against him, t o conduct his defense in a rational 
manner and to coopera ~ e with his counsel in his defense 
[State vs. Buchanan, 4 Ariz. 100, 381 Pac. 2d 954 (1963); 
People vs. Merkouris, 52 Cal. 2d 672, 344 Pac. 1, cert. den. 
361 U.S. 943, 4 L. Ed , 2d 364, 80 Sup. Ct. 411 (1960); 
People vs. Bender, 20 I ll. 2d 45, 169 N.E. 2d 328 (1960); 
People vs. Burson, 11 I ll. 2d 360, 143 N.E. 2d 239 (1957); 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 144, C · minal Law, Sec. 63]. 
This has it s r ots in an 1868 case wherein the 
court held that t he o ~ ~ inary presumption of criminal 
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responsibility is reversed in the case of a deaf mute; it 
is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the accused had 
the capacity and reasoning sufficient to enable him to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong as to the act at the time 
---
it was committed [State vs. Draper, 1 Del. (Houst.) 291 
(1868)] . --
. Failure to Reply 
Failure of a defendant to reply to a statement of 
.fact cannot be deemed an admission unless the statement was 
- made in his hearing presence. Such a statement, or lack of 
it, is not admissible where the party was unable to hear it 
as where he was deaf [Tufts vs. Charlestown, 70 Mass. (4 
Gray) 537 (1855)]. The mere fact that the party was within 
hearing distance of the speaker is not sufficient unless 
-the situation was such that the individual must necessarily 
have heard it made [Ruth vs. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac. 
2d 304 (1947); Jackson vs. Builder·s' Woodworking Co., 91 
Hun. 435, 36 N.Y.S. 227 (1895); Josephi vs. Furnish, 27 
Ore. 260, 41 Pac. 424 (1915), 3la C.J.S. 1035, Evidence, 
Sec. 2 95b] . 
Leading Questions 
The rule against asking one's own witness leading 
questions is not absolute. When the witness is a deaf mute, 
the allowance of such questions on direct examination is 
within the discretion of the trial judge [State vs. Burns, 
78 N.W. 681 (1899)]. In the case of Alabama & Vicksburg 
Ry. Co. vs. Kelly, 126 Miss. 276, 88 So. 707 (1921) 
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regarding the use of leading questions, the court stated, 
" h. k h d h h . ... wet ~n t e recor sows tat (leading questions were) 
necessary in order that their minds might be directed to 
the question." 
Becaus-e the deaf often have a habit of saying "yes" 
to questions they do not fully understand, the use of lead-
ing questions has been objected to in nearly every instance. 
Deaf persons should be encouraged to tes·tify in their own 
words, not merely say "yes" or "no" to leading questions, 
in order to avoid possible errors due to limited language 
abilities on their part. 
Jury Instructions 
When preparing jury instructions that apply to the 
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whether or not the court should instruct the jury in a case 
involving a deaf person that they must not sympathize with 
the deaf person ·solely because he is deaf . . This question 
was passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court in the case 
of Jakubiec vs. Hasty, 337 Mich. 205, 59 N.W. 2d 385 
(1953). In this case the plaintiff was a deaf woman who 
was struck by a taxicab. The attorneys for the taxicab 
company appealed on the basis the trial judge refused to 
give these instructions to the jury. The appellate court 
held the failure to give such instructions was not a re-
versible error and upheld the judgment for the deaf woman. 
Hearing-impaired Prosecutor 
A solicitor who was hard of hearing was permitted 
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to stand near the witness box so long as there was no 
threatening nor intimidating contact with them on his part 
[Powell et al vs. State, 33 Ala. App. -- 323, 33 So. 2d 399 
(1948), 23a C.J.S. 
. 
122, Criminal Law, Sec. 1087] . 
Heari-ng-impaired Juror , . ' ·-
A new trial will not be granted because of the 
deafness of a juror where the accused failed to examine him 
~ 
for such when he was empaneled [U.s: vs. Baker (N.Y.) 
D.C.N.Y., 24 F. Cas~," para. 14,499, 3 Ben. 68; Higgins vs. 
Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 767, 155 S.W. 2d 209 (1941); Drake 
vs. State, 5 Tex. App. 649]. 
The same is true where the juror admitted a slight 
deafness but .was very definite that he heard all the tes-
timony per ~arish vs. ~tate, 11 Ukla. cr. 4jb, l4Z ~ac. Zd 
642 (1943); 24 C.J.S. 99, Criminal Law, Sec. 1446(4). 
Where the jury's verdict has been questioned because 
of the admitted deafness of a juror, an appellate court has 
ordinarily not disturbed the verdict and the juror has not 
been declared incompetent . [Commonw~alth vs. Gronito, 326 
Mass. 494, 95 N.E. 2d 539 (1950), 24a C.J.S. 999, Criminal 
Law, Sec. 1884 (2)]. 
"'f ••• 
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Chapter 3 
.THE DEAF AND HEARING-IMPAIRED IN CIVIL MATTERS 
Competency, · In- General 
A common question used by psychiatrists to judge 
insanity is the question "Do you hear voices or noises 
in your head?" A person using this question may be un-
aware of the common medical condition among deaf persons 
termed tinnitus. Tinnitus results in deaf persons having 
head noises similar to that of ringing bells, whistles, 
buzzing or other types of noises. A deaf person suffering 
from tinnitus will probably answer such a question in the 
affirma ti""'ve, and ·the psychiatrist may c-onclude that the 
deaf person has hallucinations, a serious sign of mental 
illness. 
The deaf are much in need of proper protection 
against mistaken commitments to mental institutions, and 
at present there is very little adequate protection. 
If the only unusual conduct observed is that a per-
son appears to be deaf and does not speak, this does not in 
any way indicate the person is mentally incompetent or ill 
[Challiner vs. Smith, 397 Ill. 106, 71 N.E. 2d 324 (1947)]. 
Incompetency and Guardianships 
The physical condition of a person alleged to be 
incompetent may be considered only insofar as it affects 
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his mental condition [Fiala vs. Tomek, 164 Nebr. 20, 81 
N.W. 2d 691 (1957); 41 Am. Jur. 2d 679, Incompetent Persons, 
Sec. 145]. Thus the element of physical disability is in-
sufficient evidence of mental infirmity to justify appoint-
ment of a guardian unless the disabilities may be directly 
concluded as being responsible for th~ perso~~~ inability 
. to manage his property or person [39 ~~. Jur. 2d 23, 
Guardian and Ward, Sec. 21]. 
The test established in the case of In re Coburn, 
165 Cal. 202, 131 Pac. 352 (1913), dealt with whether or 
not the person in question is able, unassisted, to properly 
manage to take care of. himself and his property, and by 
reason thereof would be likely to be deceived or imposed 
upon by artful or designing persons. The court upheld the 
constitutionality of this definition of incompetency, 
stating that in the final analysis, a person's mental dis-
ability must be based upon his conduct, actions and state-
ments in connection with surrounding circumstances and 
conditions. 
In the case of In ~Guardianship of Eleanor Frank, 
137 N.W. 2d 219 (1965), 9 A.L.R. 3d 764, the question of 
the woman's incompetency was based partly on the fact that 
her IQ was tested and shown to be 67, which is just below 
borderline mental retardation and is within the range of 
educable mentally retarded. 15 In her physical examination 
it was found she was suffering from some physical infirmi-
ties incident to her advanced years, such as de~fness, but 
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there was nothing to show that the clearness of her mind had 
been impaired to any substantial degree by any of these in-
firmities. The issue was brought because the woman, an 
elderly widow, had sold some of her property .to a favorite 
son for a pr-ice below that offered by one of her daughters. 
Because the woman had deliberately refused the larger amount 
of money, the daughter attempted to prove her mother incom-
petent to handle her affairs. The court relied on the 
established definition of competency, stating that incom-
petency is not shown by the refusal of an offer of more 
money if the seller's preference is to deal with another 
individual, regardless of the price. 
It was specifically held by the New York courts in 
- - a • - --- • -
~ne case OI ~rower vs. ~1~ner, 4 donns ~n. q4L ~~ov~J, ~naL 
the fact a person is a deaf mute is insufficient grounds in 
itself for the appointment of a· guardian. 
Capacity to Make Contracts 
Under ancient common law a deaf mute was considered 
incapable of making a valid contract, on the theory that 
such a person would be unable to comprehend the true nature 
of the contract and could be easily deceived into entering 
into contracts harmful to him. 
The courts have since adopted the opposite theory, 
and now hold that contracts entered into by such persons 
are valid, as in the case of Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich. 
36, 115 N.W. 251 (1908). Here, a man 27 years old, who had 
been deaf since the age of three, entered into a written 
J 
contract in which he agreed to do manual labor in exchang·e 
for room, board and other services, but without monetary 
remuneration. After working many years, the deaf man 
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brought suit against his employer for the value of the work 
he had done, claiming he had not really understood the 
terms of the contract. The jury found in his- favor, and 
the employer appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court on the 
ground the contract was binding upon the deaf man. Th·e ap-
pellate court held the man had ordinary intelligence and 
the terms of the contract had been made reasonably clear 
to him before he signed it. He was, therefore, bound by 
the contract and was not allowed to recov.er from. t ~ e em-
ployer. 
Such persons may also mak.e a valid co veya c~e f 
property where the nature of the transactio a , he · -
strument signed are understood by the i di 1. ua er 
Brown vs. Bro~m, 3 Conn. 299 (1820). 
In the case of Selanak vs. Se anak 5 
399 (1909), a deaf man worked for many ears f r a c · se 
relative without pay except for his roo a ar 
a number of years, he sued for the value f t · e r e 
had done. The court explained that ere a er 0 s 
work for a member of the family, t ' ere is a 
that the work was done free of charge, as a g· f ' . 
But in this case, the deaf a a ee rea 
as a member of the family, havi g ee e 
barn among other ill-treat e t ace r e i e 
e 
e 
Appellate Court, therefore, held that the usual rule did 
not apply and the man was entitled to recover the value of 
the work he had done. 
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The fact a deaf person cannot hear nor speak does 
not in itself - ~revent him from entering into a legally 
binding contract. In the case of Russell vs: Rutledge, 158 
Ill. App. 259 (1910), the court held that a valid contract 
could be made through the action of a deaf individual 
merely nodding his head in consent. 
The case of Fewkes vs. Borah, 376 Ill. 596, 35 N.E. 
2d 69 (1941), dealt with a man of 75 years who had been 
deaf all his life and had lived alone. Two men came to his 
house ·and induced him to sign an oil lease on certain real 
estate that he own-ea. 1n -court, -ne test:l.I~ea ne cou1.a reaa 
the lease but not the small print, that he did not under-
stand what he was signing and that he signed only because 
he was afraid of the men. 
· The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
deaf man, stating, "There is, however, sufficient evidence 
of plaintiff's infirmity to require that those dealing with 
him use utmost good faith.u This case established the prin-
ciple still in use today requiring persons engaged in busi-
ness with the deaf to use "utmost good faith." 
In the case of Collins vs. Trotter, 81 Mo. 275 
(1889), the Supreme Court of Missouri set a different pre-
cedent in an effort to protect deaf persons from the conse-
quences of contracts entered into by them. In this case 
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two deaf persons had signed a promissory note, and when 
sued on the note, contended they were incompetent to defend 
themselves in court due to their disabilities. A petition 
was filed to have a guardian appointed for them to defend 
them in the ligitation. The court stated the burden of 
showing the defendants' competency was on the--plaintiffs, 
and, since the plaintiffs had failed to prove this at the 
trial, the note was held to be invalid. 
These cases show there are three different view-
points applied by courts to the issue of contracts made by 
deaf persons: 
1. That deaf persons are fully competent and will 
be held to the contracts in the same manner as those pos-
sessing normal hearing. 
2. That those dealing with a deaf person must use 
good faith. 
3. That those suing a deaf person have the burden . 
of proving the deaf person was competent to enter into a 
contract. 
The first viewpoint is the one followed most fre-
quently. It would appear that contracts cannot be voided 
merely because the person is deaf. 
It is generally not a defense for a deaf person to 
say that he looked over a contract but did not actually 
read it. If the contract was put before him and he knew 
how to read, it is his responsibility to read it before 
signing. 
Moreover, it is generally not a defense for a deaf 
person to say he read a document and does not understand 
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it. As in the case of normal-hearing persons, it is assumed 
that when a person reads a document and does not understand 
it, it is his -responsibility ·to obtain legal advice before 
signing. --
Most persons who are deaf from early childhood are 
educated at special state schools for the deaf, wherein 
they spend most of their time in a carefully protected 
environment where fair and proper treatment is the rule. 
Upon completion of their education, and upon their 
entrance into the outside business world, such persons are 
apt to assume the same kind of considerate treatment will 
still prevail. It is important, theretore, that their 
education include some special counseling, advising them 
never to sign an important · document without observing ut-
most caution in so doing. 
It is extremely doubtful that, at the present time, 
a court would impute i~competency to a deaf mute in view of 
the remarkable achievements. recorded by persons thus af-
flicted and the vast strides in technology in perfecting 
aids for lessening the disabilities incidental to deaf-
ness as well as to muteness [41 Am. Jur. 2d 612, Incom-
petent Persons: Contracts and conveyances, Sec. 73]. It 
has been stated, however, that a mental disability coupled 
with both physical disability, such as deafness, and ad-
vanced age can constitute sufficient proof of lack of 
capacity to make a contract per Kvale vs. Kean 39 N D e' . . 
560, 168 N.W. 74 (1918), 9 A.L.R. 972. 
Capacity to Marry 
The court in Johnson vs. Johnson (N.D.) 104 N.W. 
2d 8 (1916), - fr~A.L.R. 2d 1029, adopted the rule that the 
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best accepted test as to whether there is mental capacity 
sufficient to contract a valid marriage in the case of deaf 
persons, is whether or not there is a capacity to under-
stand the nature of the contract and the . duties andre-
sponsibilities which it creates. 
In the case of In~ Smith, 27 Ohio 533 (1927), 
the marriage was considered valid so long as both parties 
had the understanding and mental capacity to realize what 
was being done ana consent1ng tnereto. 
This standard has its roots in an early English 
case [Harrod vs. Harrod, 1 Kay and J. 4, 69 Eng. Reprint 
344 (1854), 52 Am. Jur. 2d 879, Marriage, Sec. 18], wherein 
the woman who was alleged mentally incompetent to contract 
marriage had been deaf and mute from childhood. The court 
commented, "This person was deaf and dumb and that her mind 
was, in that sense, dull, even perhaps more so than the 
minds of persons who are afflicted by these calamities 
generally are, it seems not to have been in any degree un-
sound. It is clearly the law that the presumption is 
always in favor of sanity, and there is no exception to 
this rule in the case of a deaf and du~b person. But the 
onus of proving the unsoundness of the mind of such a 
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person must rest on those who dispute her sanity. There is 
nothing in our experience which would lead us to conclude 
, 
that the deaf and dumb are generally of unsound mind." 
It has since been said that the mental strength re-
quired for the .. transaction of business is not necessary to 
enable the party to contract a marriage, although he must 
be capable of_ understanding the nature of the contract 
[Flynn vs. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275, 26 N.E. 2d 91 (1940)]. 
The court further stated that if a person has sufficient 
mental capacity to enter into general contracts, it seems 
he has sufficient mental capacity to enter into a contract 
to marry. It was thus declared by the court that it need 
not determine the issue of whether less mental capacity is 
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marriage than is required t~ contract generally. 
The ruling of the court in Forbis vs. Forbis (Mo. 
App.), 274 S.W. 2d 800 (1955), established that no greater 
mental capacity is required to make bindi g a atrimonial 
contract than other business contracts. 
Wills 
Capacity to Make 
The general principle regar ~ 
deaf persons to make wills is that 
[Potts vs. House, 6 Ga. 324 (18 
This is generally based 
been accomplished in the educat· 
mute, and such important positions ~ 
e a a 
e, i 




de a and 
dustry, 
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commerce and statesmanship are filled by men and women who 
are deficient or entirely devoid of the sense of sight, 
hearing or speech that a court would cast reproach upon it-
self to hold that they are incapable of making wills merely 
because of the deficiency [57 Am. Jur. 86, Wills, Sec. 72]. 
There are, however, at least three cases on record 
in which wills made by deaf persons were declared invalid 
because of the physical handicap of the deaf person. In 
the case of Payton vs. Shi~ley, 80 Okla. 145, 195 Pac. 125 
(1921), the deaf person had never attended school and had 
only very crude methods of indicating his ideas. It had 
been held in an earlier case that this particular man was 
i ncapable of making a deed. The Oklahoma Supreme. Court 
held that under the circumstances he lacked capacity to 
make a will and, therefore, the document he had executed 
was declared invalid. 
In a similar case, Rollwagen vs. Rollwagen, 63 
N.Y. 504, the New York Supreme Court held invalid a wi ll 
made by an illiterate, partly paralyzed an whose speech 
was so defective that only one perso clai ed to be able 
to understand him, and where t he circums ances surrounding 
the execution of the will were sus ic _ 
In the case of In ~ Ferr1s' 
115, 169 Atl. 697, aff. 117 N.J. Eq. 
(1934), a lawyer wrote a will for a e 1 
5· J. Eq. 
1 . 708 
eaf woman and 
asked her in written questions if she agree to the will 
and if she wished the witnesses to attest 1t. She nodded 
her head affirmatively, and the witnesses then signed the 
will. However, the written questions had been shown only 
to the woman and not to the witnesses. The New Jersey 
courts held the will was invalid because the witnesses did 
not fully understand what the woman was agreeing to. The 
court held that the written questions should have been 
shown to the witnesses. 
In general, courts rule that deaf persons are 
-
usually capable of making valid wills. The courts may re-
quire more proof than usual to show that the deaf individ-
ual understood what he was doing and that he executed the 
. -
will of his own free choice [Lane vs. Lane, 95 N.Y. 494]. 
Capacity to Witness 
It was held in the case of Succession of Beattie, 
163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1927), that a deaf person is not 
a competent witness to the signing of a will of another 
person. The reason in this case was that the law required 
the person making the will acknowledge to the witnesses 
that he intended the document to be his will, and the deaf 
person is unable to hear this statement. 
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In view of all other principles of law which have 
been established regarding the capacity of deaf persons , it 
would reasonably follow that a deaf person would be a com-
petent witness to a will if the acknowledgment by the person 
making the will were communicated to the deaf witness in 
writing or in some other manner. 
The State of Louisiana is the only state having ·a 
statute specifically stating that deaf persons are incom-
petent witnesses to wills. 16 
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Injuries by Automobiles and Highway Traffic to Deaf Persons 
A considerable number of cases involving deaf 
pedestrians who\Nere struck by automobiles or other vehicles 
have been litigated in various - state supreme -courts. These 
generally involve deaf persons who failed to hear an auto-
mobile horn and were struck from behind. 
The case of Crawley vs. Jermain, 218 Ill. App. 51 
(~920), involved a woman who could not hear and who also 
had a severe visual problem. While walking along a side-
walk, she crossed the defendant's driveway. The defendant 
had been backing his car out of the driveway and had honked 
. -n1s norn ~o warn peaes~r1ans. ~ne woman a~a noc near cne 
horn and was struck and injured. The driver contended he 
was not responsible for her injuries because he had blown 
his horn, and he had no way of knowing that the woman was 
deaf. The court held that the woman had a perfect right to 
assume the sidewalk was safe for her to walk upon and that 
it was as safe for a deaf and nearsighted person as it was 
for those whose faculties of sight and hearing were normal, 
and, additionally, it was incumbent upon the driver to pro-
ceed across the sidewalk cautiously so as to avoid running 
over pedestrians rightfully proceeding upon it. 
In the case of Furtado vs. Bird [26 Cal. App. 152, 
-
146 Pac. 58 (1915)], a deaf man was riding a horse along a 
road. A man driving his car down the road honked his horn 
when he was a short distance away from the deaf man, who 
did not hear the horn. The horse and deaf rider were 
struck by the automobile, and the driver claimed that the 
deaf man was partly responsible because he failed to look 
in both direc·ti.ons. 
The California Appellate Court said: --
(The driver} contends that (the deaf 
man) was guilty of contributing to his injury 
because, being hard of hearing, it was his duty 
to look back as well as forward, and that, if 
he had been doing so, this accident would not 
have occurred. We do not think it was (the 
deaf man's) duty to be constantly looking back. 
Both parties had an equal right to the use of 
the road, but . (the driver) was in a better 
position to avoid a collision, and, when he 
observed that (the deaf man) appeared not to 
hear the horn, it was (the driver's) duty to 
slow down, and even to stop his car if neces-
sarv to avoid runnin~ a~ainst (the deaf man's) 
horse. 
In a number of cases in which verdicts in favor of 
37 
deaf pedestrians were issued, the courts pointed out a deaf 
pedestrian is called upon to use those unimpaired senses 
with a higher degree of alertness than would be the case if 
his senses were all normal [Foster vs. Cumberland County 
Power & Light Co., 116 Maine 184, 100 Atl. 833 (1917), 
L.R.A. 1917e 1044]. 
In the case of Wilson vs. Freeman, 271 Mass. 438, 
171 N.E. 469 (1930), ~he court held in favor of a deaf 
pedestrian who was struck from behind by a truck. In dis-
cussing the degree of care required by the deaf man, the 
court stated: 
The deafness of the plaint iff did not 
deprive him of the rights of a traveler. That 
infirmity required increased and commensurate 
circumspection on his part in order to attain 
the standard of conduct established by the law 
for everybody. . ..... 
Similarly, in the case of Robb vs. Quaker City Cab 
: 
Co., 283 Pa \ 454, 129 Atl. 331 (1925), the court, in hold-
ing in favor of a deaf man hit by a cab while_crossing the 
street, said: .. 
Plaintiff was a deaf mute requiring 
more care on his part but did not of itself 
convict him of negligence in attempting to 
cross the stre t. A citizen's right upon 
the public highway does not depend upon his 
ability to hear, so long as he makes proper 
use of his sight. 
A number of cases adjudicated in state supreme 
courts have also been decided against deaf pedestrians. 
"'9" o . 1 - - - - - .C T,.- ---- --- ,., ---- - ..&....! --- .&- 1 f'\., ,.,___ ':t r'\J. 
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140 Atl. 751 (1928), a 58-year-old hard-of-hearing male. was 
walking down a street that had no sidewalks. He walked 
close to trolley tracks in the street and was struck by 
a trolley car from behind. The Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that he could not recover because he had not exer-
cised proper care for his own safety. He knew he was deaf 
and would not be able to hear a trolley bell, and, there-
fore, he should not have walked near the tracks. 
Similarly, in the case of Hizam vs. Blackman, 103 
Conn. 547, 131 Atl. 415 (1926), a deaf man crossing the 
street at night was struck by an automobile which he had 
neither seen nor heard. The court held that he could 
easily have seen the car if he had looked, and since he 
had failed to do so, he could not recover damages. 
Where a deaf pedestrian is struck by an emergency 
vehicle such as an ambulance, police car or fire truck, it 
is generally held to be a question for the jury as to 
whether the de·a-f -person was exercising proper care for his 
own safety in view of his handicap [McCullough- vs. Lalu-
miere, 156 Maine 479, 166 Atl. 2d 702 (1960) (police car); 
Goodrich vs. Cleveland, 15 Ohio App. 15 (1875), Fink vs. 
New York, 206 Misc. 79, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 172 (1954), (fire 
truck)]. 
The general principles are well summarized in The 
Handbook on the Law on Torts, which states: 
The man who is ... deaf ... is entitled to 
1 ~"'"'"" ~- +-1-.r'!\ T.'l'l"'\-1 ri !l't"\rl l"'!l't"\-nrd· 'ho .,...o,,,;.,..ori f-1"'\ 
d~. th~--i~p;s~i.bl~ 'by conforming to ciny physical 
standards .... At the same time, his conduct must 




Deaf persons frequently use their automobiles even 
more than persons of normal hearing since a deaf person may 
not be able to use a telephone, causing him to do much of 
his business in person. 
Deaf drivers have been found to have better driving 
records than hearing motorists. The driving records of 100 
Colorado deaf drivers were compared with two groups each of 
100 average-hearing drivers of that state, and it was found 
there were 54 per cent fewer moving violations in the deaf 
p~pula~i~n than in Gr~up A ~f ~h~ hearing drivers and 113 
per cent fewer violations than in Group B. 18 
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In Kentucky, motor vehicle administrators indicated 
that during a five-year period, no deaf drivers had been 
I 
called for a hearing preliminary to revocation of a driver's 
license. 19 
A surv~y __ of hearing-impaired drivers in Wisconsin 
found they had a comparatively low rate of accident in-
volvement and that no deaf person in the seven years prior 
to the survey had been involved in a fatal traffic acci-
20 
dent. 
A survey undertaken by the National Association of 
the Deaf disclosed that, compared to overall accident rates, 
drivers who were not deaf had more than four times as many 
accidents per year as deaf drivers. 21 
• -- --'- ~-1 - • 'n-..lL--1- .:-..l.: ............ .-,l 
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million drivers revealed that the deaf driver is likely to 
be the safest and most careful driver. 22 
It has been specifically held that licensed drivers 
with impaired hearing have a right to drive, per Dillen-
schneider vs. Campbell (Mo.), 350 S.W. 2d 260 (1961), 60a 
C.J.S. 115, Motor Vehicles, Sec. 692. This case also 
established that the motorist was not guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law simply because he was a deaf mute, nor 
was his passenger guilty of contributory negligence simply 
because she rode as a · p~ssenger in an automobile driven by 
a deaf mute. 
The operator of a motor vehicle cannot claim exemp-
tion from the consequence of an accident caused by his 
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unskillfulness in handling his vehicle upon the ground that 
his physical deficiencies handicapped him [Roberts vs. Ring, 
143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W. 437 (1919), 8 Am. Jur. 2d 243, 
Automobiles, Sec. 692; Atkinson vs. Cardinal State Lines 
Co. , 148 Kan. 24·4~ 80 Pac. 2d 107 3 (1938)] . 
In the Atkinson vs. Cardinal State Lines Co. case, 
the question of contributory negligence was again con-
sidered. It appeared that a bus driver who attempted to 
overtake an auto driven by the plaintiff, a deaf mute, at-
tempted to apply his air brakes when he saw two cars 
approaching his bus from the opposite direction. When the 
brakes failed to respond, he sounded his horn repeatedly, 
but the plaintiff made no response to the sound of the 
horn. The plaintiff's car was hit twice by the bus, caus-
ing the plaintiff to lose control of his car and resulting 
in injury to the deaf man. Upon appeal, the court af-
firmed the judgment for the plaintiff. The court made a 
point, however, of stating that the q~estion of whether 
the plaintiff's failure to hear the horn was the· cause of 
the accident was an issue to be determined by a jury and 
that this decision for the plaintiff did not necessarily 
set a precedent in favor of deaf drivers. 
If a driver's hearing is impaired, he is neverthe-
less required to hear, at his peril, that which a normal 
driver would hear, per Bull vs. Drew, 286 App. Div. 1138, 
146 N.Y.S. 2d 85, reh. denied 1 App. Div. 2d 793, 149 
N.Y.S. ·2d 235 (1956). 
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If the driver is deaf, there is an increased duty 
upon him to keep a sharp lookout as in approaching railroad 
crossings upon which he knows trains often pass [Penn vs. 
Pearce, 121 Fla. 3, 163 So. 288 (1935)]. 
Contributory negligence of a partially deaf person 
was held to exist in Dardenne vs. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 
13 La. App. 262, 127 So. 458 (1930), wherein the plain-
tiff's partial deafness caused him not to hear the whistle 
and sound of the bell of an approaching railroad train, and 
the court held that he clearly contributed to the accident 
by his carelessness in not exercising more care in crossing 
the railroad tracks. The court said that the fact he suf-
fered with this infirmity demanded the exercise of care of 
commensurate degree. 
Many states have a question on the driver's license 
application form similar to "Do you have any physical 
handicap which would affect your ability to drive safely?" 
Deaf persons sometimes read this question as if it said 
"Do you have any physical handicap? ," omitting the quali-
fying phrase" ... which would affect your ability to drive 
safely." If the question is misread 1. · t s manner , the 
deaf person may answer "yes," and be a ·t at1..cally dis-
qualified from obtaining a driver 's lice ·e 
The State of Florida enacted a a~ 1971 which 
allows deaf persons the right to have an interpreter with 
1 • f d • I 1• 23 them at the time of app icat~on or a r~ver s J.cense. 
Applications for Insurance 
When an application for an insurance policy is 
being filled out, the insurance agent generally asks ques-
tions of the person to be insured and then writes the 
answers on the application form. After completing the 
forms, the client is asked to sign the application. If 
the client involved is deaf, the agent may misunderstand 
the answers to his questions and thus write down something 
incorrect; similarly, the deaf person may misinterpret the 
agent's questions and give an incorrect response. 
In the case of Colaneri vs; General Accident 
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Assurance Corp., Ltd., 126 App. Div. 591, 110 N.Y.S. 678 
(1888), the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
insurance company. In this case, a deaf man who could not 
read, filled out the application form with the help of the 
insurance agent. The papers contained the statement nthe 
applicant has never received any injury or suffered from 
any disease or sickness of any kind." Actually, the in-
sured had suffered from ear trouble prior to that time. 
After the policy was issued, he again suffered from the ear 
pathology and filed a claim on his health insurance policy 
which the company refused to pay due to the false state-
ment on his application. 
The case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. vs. Ervin, 229 
Ala. 352, 156 So. 844 (1934), involved a deaf woman who 
took out an insurance policy naming her brother, who was 
also deaf, as beneficiary. Soon after, she had an accident 
44 
and died. The insurance company refused to pay on the 
policy because the application form contained the statement 
"Neither my hearing nor vision is impaired." At the trial 
it was proven that neither .of the deaf persons was able 
to read, and they· did not know the agent had allowed this 
statement to remain in the application form. ·- The Alabama 
Supreme Court held the beneficiary was entitled to recover 
on the policy in spite of the incorrect statement in the 
application. This falls back to the ·principle regarding 
contracts wherein those dealing with deaf persons are re-
quired to use utmost good faith . 
In the case of Follete vs. Mutual Accident Insur-
ance Co., 110 N.C. 377, 14 S.E. 923 (1892), a deaf man 
bought an acc~aen~ poL~cy ~n wn~cn ~ne ~nsurance agenL 
failed to put the fact of deafness down on the application 
form. When the man was later injured, the company refused 
to pay. The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow 
the insurance company to escape liability in this manner 
' 
and included in its ruling a strongly worded opinion regarding 
the questionable business practices of the company. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from these cases 
is that a deaf person should be careful to see that the in-
surance application clearly states that he is deaf, and 
that no incorrect statements appear in the application 
which may have been caused by any misunderstanding. Where 
a false statement is discovered, the insurance company 
should be immediately informed of the error so that it 
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cannot later be used as a defense for not paying a claim on 
the policy. 
Where a false statement has been made in an insurance 
application, · the courts frequently hold that the insurance 
company cannot -·avoid making payment that is due on the 
policy unless they can show that the false s -tatement materi-
ally affected the risk that was assumed by the company. In 
other words, the court may hold that the misstatement must 
be proven to be material and significant in character. 
Libel and Slander 
Libel and slander are the main branches of the law 
of defamation of character. They consist of false, malicious 
statements about a person which tend to injure that person 
in his reputation or his business and which must be over-
heard and understood by a third party to be considered 
defamation [SO Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, Sec. 1]. 
It has been argued that a defamatory statement made 
in the language of signs should be classified as a libel 
rather than a slander. Since it has been held that a 
motion picture may be considered to create a libel [Brown 
vs. Paramount Picture Corp., 270 N.Y.S. 544, 240 App. Div. 
520 (1934)], it is argued that the use of signs, which con-
sist of actions or pictures, should likewise be classified 
as libel. This line of argument follows the theory that a 
libel is something visual that can be seen by the human eye 
[50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, Sec. 4]. Therefore, 
since the language of signs i~ visual in nature, it should 
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be considered a libel. The general principles on this sub-
ject are still in a state of flux.24 
Child Custody and Adoption· · 
It has been held that deafness may prevent a woman 
from obtaining the-·custody of her children, and that they 
may be better off in a public institution than-living with 
their mother. This unusual decision was reached in the 
case of Howard vs. Ragsdale (Ky.), 249 S.W. 2d 154 (1952). 
In this case, a husband .and wife had three children, all 
under the age of 10. When the parents separated, the 
children were placed in a public institution. The deaf 
mother later brought a legal proceeding to secure their 
release from the institution and to obtain custody. The 
court stated the children had lived in the institution for 
five years, that they were doing well there and that the 
mother was a deaf mute who lived with other deaf mutes. 
The court held it would not return these children to their 
mother because they would be placed in a completely dif-
ferent and strange environment and would have great diffi-
culty in living and communicating with deaf mutes. The 
children were, therefore, left in the public institution. 
It would seem that a great deal of effort must be 
made to educate the courts as to the capabilities of deaf 
parents. This can be done through the testimony of expert 
witnesses who are familiar with the education and upbring-
ing of children by deaf parents. Experts on this subject 
can be located through such organizations for the deaf as 
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Gallaudet College in Washington, D.C. (the only institution 
of higher learning in the world exclusively for . the deaf), 
the American Hearing Society, the National Association of 
the Deaf, the Association of American Instructors of the 
Deaf, the Counci-l -of Organizations Serving the Deaf and the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 
A long and bitter battle by a deaf couple for the 
adoption of a newborn infant. began in 1966 in the Cali-
fornia case of In ~ Adoption of Scott James Richardson, 
251 Cal. App. 221 (1966). 
The deaf couple, Wayne and }1adeline Christensen, 
had been married 17 years, and the husband had been em-
ployed at the same job for 11 years; they had ample insur-
ance, a large equity in a new three-bedroom home, two 
automobiles and a savings account. The husband had been 
a licensed driver for 28 years, and both were active 
members and officers of their church. In due course, a 
baby from an unwed mother was placed in the Christensen 
home; the Adoption Bureau investigated and approved the 
home and the parents. The medical report on the child was 
in order. Without warning, the judge in the Los Angeles 
County Superior Court questioned whether the court was 
doing right by giving a healthy, normal child to handi-
capped people, and therefore would not allow the adoption 
proceedings to continue. 
A continuance was obtained to a new court date at 
which time 17 expert witnesses testified in favor of the 
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adoption, all to no avail. Hundreds of affidavits, letters 
and newspaper articles favored the adoption. The only op-
position came from the judge, who subsequently was discov-
ered to have written, five months prior to the court 
hearing, "I pelieve ... this adoption should be nipped in the 
bud .... In my opinion, we are not doing right in ... approving 
an adoption to 'deaf-mutes' (sic). '"25 
The Christensens appealed and eventually won a new 
adoption hearing, the appellate court saying the judge (1) 
was biased and prejudiced because of the deafness of the 
parents, (2) grossly abused his discretion, (3) acted be-
yond the jurisdiction of a statute, and (4) violated the 
"Due Process" and "Equal Protection" clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Costitution. The new judge 
approved the adoption of the infant, after 18 months of 
litigation. 
A sidelight in this case is that the infant has 
since been diagnosed as having a severe hearing loss in one 
ear and some impairment in the other ear. This condition 





It has , been shown through extensive research that 
there is a serious deficiency in the amount Q~ _ available 
data concerning the many difficulties encountered by the 
deaf and hearing-impaired. Such data, if made available, 
could be utilized by attorneys in preparation of cases for 
clients so afflicted. The deaf population of our country 
has also displayed an apparent need for information of this 
kind, containing advice and counseling for them in how to 
cope with everyday problems. Moreover, no significant pub-
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upon the deaf population of this country. The ignorance of 
the public is certainly one of the reasons for these appar-
ent injustices. 
The purpose of this study was to accumulate infor-
mation, which could be transposed into any of the above 
three informational formats. The research which achieved 
this objective was accomplished thro~gh the utilization of 
three legal digests, Shepard's Citations, Corpus Juris 
Secundum and American Jurisprudence. The attempt was made 
to review every legal case in the United States' judicial 




The researched cases were divided into two main 
categories, courtroom matters and civil matters, with ) 
several subheadings such as competency as a witness, methods 
of testifying, incompetency and guardianships and capacity 
to make contra~ts. 
Although only three states have enacted statutes 
guaranteeing the furnishing of an interpreter at the cost 
of the court in criminal action involving a deaf litigant, 
it would appear that a deaf person in any state requesting 
this service would be accorded the same right. This sup-
position is based upon two areas of established law. 
First, where a person who speaks a foreign language 
to the exclusion of a clear understanding of English, ap-
- -pears in a court act~on, an ~nterpreter oi ~nat Iore~gn 
language is provided by the court. - · 
Additionally, there is a steady trend toward 
broadening the rights of indigent persons appearing before 
the bench. It has been determined that indigents, in the 
constitutional guarantee of due process, may be represented 
by legal counsel, provided a complete copy of the trans-
cript of trial proceedings for appeal purposes and even 
offered investigative services, again for appeal purposes, 
all at no cost to such individuals. It logically follows 
that indigent deaf persons have the same rights to due 
process including, in their case, interpreters in judicial 
proceedings. 
The outrageous mistreatment of hearing-handicapped 
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persons described herein in Chapter 1 serves as proof that 
such persons are commonly discriminated against in the 
everyday world. If such individuals attempt to seek legal 
recourse for these abuses, their hands are, in effect, tied 
at the door to- ·the courthouse as evidenced by the informa-
tion found in Chapter 2 regarding courtroom matters. The 
civil matters detailed in Chapter 3 offer further support 
of the charges claiming unfair practices in matters in-
volving deaf persons. 
Upon final review of the cases cited herein, it is 
concluded that because of the severe communication problems 
of the deaf and hearing-impaired, these persons have suf-
fered unfairly in spite of the courts generally dec+aring 
- -them a~ competent: ~na~v~aual.s. J.t: ~s ~mpor-can-c -cna.t. l.ru:::H:~ 
hardships be exposed to the general public in an effort to 
lessen their occurrence, that the deaf themselves be better 
educated in how to handle many of the dilemmas they may 
encounter and that the legal proceedings involving these 
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Appendix A 
LIST OF CASES CITED 
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Atkinson vs. Cardinal State Lines Co. 
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Bugg vs. Houlka 
Bull vs. Drew 
Burgess vs. State 
Challiner vs. Smith 
-
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Colaneri~s~-General Accident Assurance Corp., Ltd. 
- Collins vs. Trotter 
Commonwealth vs. Gronito 
Crawlev vs. Jermain 
Dardennc vs. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. 
Dillenschneider vs. Campbell 
Dobbins vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. Co. 
Drake vs. State 
Felts vs. Murphy 
Ferris' Will, In re 
Fewkes vs. Borah 
Fiala vs. Tomek 
Field vs. State 
Fink vs. New York 
Flynn vs. Troesch 
Forbis vs. Forbis 
Follete vs. Mutual Accident Insurance Co. 
Foster vs. Cumberland County Power & Light Co. 
Frank, In re Guardianship of Eleanor 
Furtadovs-. -Bird 
Goodrich vs. Cleveland 
Harrod vs. Harrod 
Higgins vs. Commonwealth 
Hizam vs. Blackman 
Howard vs. Ragsdale 
Hudson vs. Augustine's, Inc. 
Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. vs. Ervin 
Jackson vs. Builders' Woodworking Co. 
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Johnson vs. Johnson 
Josephi vs. Furnish 
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Lord Hale, Pleas of the Crown 
McCullough vs. _La1umiere 
Morrison vs. Lennard 
Morse vs. Phillips 
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State vs. Weldon 
Stevens vs. Page 
Territory vs. Duran 
Terry vs. State 
Tufts vs. Charlestown 
U . S . v s . Bake r 
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